Hyland described the placebo effect in clinical practice as useful but fickle (1). I am not sure these two descriptors are wholly compatible, yet probably all clinicians who manage patients with headache succeed sometimes -to their patients' benefit -not by their experienced and skilful selection of the right treatment but through the placebo effect of whatever they happen to choose.
It is tempting in such cases to view placebo medications as the treatment of choice: 'their undoubted effectiveness in . . . some disorders, along with their obvious safety and lack of side-effects, makes them in some ways an ideal form of treatment' (2) . But it is clear that not every patient will benefit from placebo, whilst clinical trials are designed specifically to prove that active treatments bring greater probability of benefit. When, if ever, should placebo be used therapeutically?
Pascual-Lozano et al. (3) describe a 76-year-old man with a chronic daily headache syndrome refractory to various active medications but showing sustained response to and well controlled by placebo. Such cases defy explanation since it would be illogical to postulate that active treatments do not exert placebo effect. They also raise an important ethical issue, not discussed in the paper, which is the employment of deceit in order to administer placebo with therapeutic intent.
Many commentators on healthcare ethics recommend the application of four principles to ethical analysis: respect for autonomy, beneficence, nonmaleficence and justice (4) . Added to these should be considerations of scope (5) (to which I will return). The four principles themselves are not contentious, except in the argument, which is not universally accepted, that they are sufficient on their own to guide the way through all ethical dilemmas (5). Not uncommonly, however, these four principles are found to be in conflict. The problem then is how to rank in importance the conflicting principles if one has to be favoured over another.
In this case, the authors were guided by beneficence, seeking the best clinical outcome for their patient. They achieved this at the expense of respect for his autonomy, since it was necessary to deceive their patient as to the nature of this medication. A utilitarian analysis might take the view that the benefit to the patient is clear, and therefore the action was (and remains) entirely justified. On the surface this appears so. Some ethicists argue that being deceived is of itself harmful, and they would hold that non-maleficence was also sacrificed here. Even so, the utilitarian analysis might still lead to a conclusion that, on balance, the good done outweighed the harm and that, with all other therapeutic options apparently exhausted, the action of using placebo was and is not merely justified but necessary within the doctors' duty to help their patient.
Such utilitarian arguments are seductive, but commonly flawed. Often standing against them is the principle that the consent of patients is required for whatever is done to them. This principle is stated explicitly or implicitly in virtually all codes of ethics and guidance on ethical practice since the Nuremberg trials (6) . It upholds autonomy, or the right to self-determination and the notion of respect for persons, against the paternalistic view that doctors know best (7) .
The utilitarian analysis outlined above not only discards the need for consent but also restricts itself to the case and to the situation now, and so is incomplete. Is the deceit to be maintained forever? Is the harm embedded in such deceit multiplied by its time duration, or by each instance of its execution? What, above all, might happen if the patient were to discover it? Going beyond the confines of the case, if this usage of placebo were to become accepted practice, what would patients more generally think of it? It is easy to imagine a future scenario in which patients were never sure that their treatment was not placebo. Every patient might be forced to have his or her medication analysed. With trust in their physicians gone (8), so would be placebo effect -the very thing from which are derived these benefits on which we sometimes rely. This is how considerations of scope must come into the analysis: it is not only the immediate parties to a healthcare transaction who may be affected by it. And when these wider considerations are included, even utilitarians must admit that it is much less clear where the balance between good and harm lies. 
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